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5.1  Introduction: Politics and Debt 
A major theme of the country studies for this project is the relation- 
ship between policy choice and economic performance. What policies 
contributed to national debt crises in the first place and what corrective 
measures have been most successful in managing them? This chapter, 
by contrast, examines the way political processes and institutions in- 
fluence developing country stabilization and adjustment efforts. Rather 
than treating policy choice as exogenous, we attempt to explain why 
countries pursue the mix of policies they do and why they vary in their 
success at implementing them. 
Of course, economic circumstance defines the policy agenda and is 
a powerful constraint on the range of options available. But states that 
are similarly situated in economic terms have adopted quite different 
adjustment strategies and external bargaining positions because of do- 
mestic political constraints. Programs that succeed in one context prove 
difficult to implement in others. Political analysis is important, there- 
fore, not  only to understanding  the past, but for generating  realistic 
and sustainable programs in the future. 
The politics of the debt crisis has unfolded on two intersecting planes, 
one international, the other domestic. Debtor governments play a Janus- 
faced role in these conflicts. Where possible, they attempt to reduce 
the costs of  adjustment through  bargaining  with  commercial  banks, 
multilateral  institutions, and creditor governments. In the first half of 
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the paper,  we  examine the determinants  of  international bargaining 
positions and outcomes. 
Since no debtor government can deflect all of the costs of adjustment, 
however, each must also bargain  with  domestic actors over how to 
allocate burdens on the home front. The central political  dilemma  is 
that stabilization and adjustment policies, no matter how beneficial they 
may be for the country as a whole, entail the imposition of short-term 
costs and have distributional implications. The second half of the paper 
examines a number of  hypotheses  on why  governments choose the 
policy packages they do and the political conditions under which they 
will be sustained. While our primary emphasis is on short- and medium- 
term adjustment, we also address the question of the institutional  and 
political  foundations of  longer-term growth strategies. The outward- 
oriented pattern of growth characteristic of the East Asian  newly  in- 
dustrializing countries (NICs) receives particular attention, since it has 
been advanced as a model for other developing countries. 
A word should be said about method. In recent years, theories of 
rational  and public choice have gained ground among political  scien- 
tists, as has the application  of econometric techniques to the study of 
political  phenomena (Alt and Chrystal 1983; Ordeshook 1986). While 
we have drawn on this literature, we do not model our arguments in a 
formal way or offer rigorous tests. We  have opted, rather, to review a 
range of  different  hypotheses and to build  some contingent generali- 
zations around the countries included  in this project and others that 
have been analyzed by political  scientists and economists. 
5.2  The International Politics of the Debt Crisis 
5.2.1  The Bargaining Structure and the Political Resources 
of the Debtors 
One of the most notable features of the crisis period  that began in 
August 1982 with the emergency rescheduling of the Mexican debt has 
been the politicization of international credit issues. International po- 
litical factors certainly played  some role in  developing country bor- 
rowing prior to the crisis. Creditor governments competed with one 
another through their export credit schemes (Wellons  1987) and Ger- 
many and Japan were able to coordinate commercial bank lending to 
further foreign  policy  goals  in  some cases (Spindler  1984).  On the 
whole, however, loan negotiations were typical of those characterizing 
any market transaction. 
Although  the Reagan  administration initially  hoped  to maintain  a 
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that has characterized the post-crisis period, concerns about the sta- 
bility of the international financial system impelled treasury and central 
bank  officials from  all  of  the  creditor countries  to  become  actively 
involved. In the case of certain strategically important countries, such 
as Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines,  Egypt, and, in a different way, 
Poland, traditional foreign policy concerns also came into play, just as 
they had in previous international financial crises (Fishlow 1986; Lin- 
dert and Morton, chap. 2 this volume; Eichengreen, chap. 3 this volume). 
Notwithstanding  calls for more comprehensive solutions, resched- 
uling remained  the  central mechanism  for managing the  debt  crisis 
through 1987. International credit flows to developing countries could 
therefore be analyzed in a bargaining framework (Krugman, chap. 7 
this volume). Despite some marginal innovations, three features of the 
international bargaining structure remained more or less constant. First 
was the assumption-or  the fiction-that  all obligations would be met 
in  full. Relief was not  on the agenda, despite the development of  a 
secondary market in which developing country debt traded at fairly 
deep discounts. Second was the assumption that the burden of  policy 
changes should fall primarily on the debtors rather than the creditors. 
Developing countries failed in  their political efforts to link the debt 
issue  with  developed country  fiscal and trade  policies,  interest-rate 
management, or the reform of international commodity trade, and had 
very  uneven  success  in  securing  additional  concessional aid  flows. 
Finally, all negotiations were handled on a case-by-case basis. Each 
debtor confronted its creditors alone, rather than in collaboration with 
other debtor countries facing similar problems. Whatever practical ar- 
guments could be advanced in favor of this system over a more com- 
prehensive one-and  there were many (Cooper 1986)-it  was clearly 
a bargaining structure that tended eo ips0 to favor the creditors. 
Within this  structure, debtor governments have had  three sets of 
resources they could draw on to improve the terms of their negotiations 
with creditors: size, political significance for creditor security calcu- 
lations, and access to nonconditional resources. 
Size 
Following Keynes’s familiar adage that big debts become the credi- 
tor’s problem, we would expect large debtors to have more leverage than 
smaller ones. Throughout the 1980s, the two countries with the largest 
debt, Brazil and Mexico, have been in a position to threaten widespread 
disruption of the financial system. Size of  the economy also matters. 
Compared to small open economies, the governments of large countries 
may perceive themselves to be in a better position to ride out the shock 
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as Brazil have long domestic traditions of economic thinking based on 
such a nationalist logic; during times of economic crisis, they are likely 
to gain in intellectual currency. 
To date, big debtors have received concessions on conditionality and 
restructuring terms that are unavailable to smaller debtors. A study of 
commercial  reschedulings  with  Latin  American  countries  by 
Bogdanowicz-Bindert (1  985) found rescheduling  packages for smaller 
debtors offered shorter  grace and repayment periods and higher spreads 
and fees than those extended to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Ven- 
ezuela. In a  study of  small countries' relations with  the IMF, John 
Williamson (1985) found evidence of some, but not marked, discrimi- 
nation in standbys and Extended Fund Facility (EFF)  agreements from 
1977 through  1984. Williamson  concluded that  small  countries were 
less likely to borrow under the EFF, were less likely to be given multi- 
year arrangements, and were likely to receive loans that were smaller 
relative to quota. On the other hand, the formula for calculating quota 
includes a measure of foreign trade relative  to GNP and thus allows 
for  the  fact  that  small  countries  are  subject  to  greater  external 
vulnerability. 
Larger debtors have also pioneered more unorthodox rescheduling 
agreements and adjustment packages. In 1985, Argentina was able to 
win IMF acceptance of the unorthodox price freeze and currency plan 
known as the Plan Austral. Mexico was the first country to receive a 
multi-year rescheduling agreement (MYRA) and in 1986-87  negotiated 
an even more unprecedented series of agreements which tied external 
financing to fluctuations  in oil prices and growth and included  an un- 
usually low interest-rate spread over LIBOR (London interbank offer 
rate for dollar deposits). Both deals were concluded only after signif- 
icant pressure from U.S. authorities. 
A broader picture of the influence of size is provided  by table 5.1, 
which  summarizes the terms of  agreements  for the rescheduling of 
medium- and long-term bank debt reached between 1978 and September 
1986. Small debtors fared worst in  terms of  the length  of  the grace 
period, the tenure of the loan agreement, and interest rates. The largest 
debtors, conversely received the best interest rates and longest loan 
tenures, and were second to the medium-sized  debtors only in length 
of grace periods.' 
Large debtors have also been more successful in securing additional 
forms of relief, including bridging  loans, cofinancing agreements and 
the maintenance of trade credits. Sachs and Huizinga (1987) have found 
that large debtors have also been more likely to secure concerted lend- 
ing agreements. Between 1983 and the third quarter of  1986, three of 
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Table 5.1  Average Terms of Bank Debt Reschedulings,  by Group of 
Countries (1978-June  1985) 
Interest Rates 
Grace Period  Maturity  (spread over LIBOR) 
Large debtors (>  $25  3.25 years  11.31 years  1.41% 
billion,  1 Jan. 1985) 
Medium-sized  debtors  4.36 years  8.28 years  1.69% 
($10 to $25 billion) 
Small debtors (< $10  2.61 years  7.26 years  1.82% 
billion) 
Source: Watson et al. (1986). 
Note: Average terms for rescheduling of medium- and long-term bank debt, both public 
and private. Excludes restructuring of short-term debt, arears. and terms of  trade fa- 
cilities.  Debtors are classified  on the basis  of  total external  liabilities  of  banks  and 
nonbanks to banks end-December 1985. “Large” debtors are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, 
and Venezuela; “medium-sized’’ debtors reaching rescheduling agreements during the 
period are Chile, the Philippines, Yugoslavia, and Poland. LIBOR = London interbank 
offer rate for dollar deposits. 
medium-sized debtors (Chile, the Philippines, Poland, and Yugoslavia) 
won concerted  lending  agreements.  Only  7 of  the 26  small  debtors 
rescheduling during this period secured concerted lending. Agreements 
signed between debtors and commercial banks in 1985 and 1986 showed 
the continuing importance of size (World Bank 1987). Agreements were 
signed  with  23  countries during these two years. Nine countries re- 
ceived new money from the commercial banks: two of the three large 
debtors signing agreements (Argentina  and Mexico); two of  the four 
medium-sized  debtors rescheduling (the Philippines  and Chile); but 
only five of  the remaining eighteen small debtors-Costa  Rica, Ivory 
Coast, Ecuador, Nigeria,  and Panama. While  Brazil  did  not receive 
new money in its agreement of July 1986, it did secure a large bridge 
loan that accounted for nearly one-third  of all the relief granted to it. 
Only  two other states received bridging  loans, Mexico and Guyana. 
Larger debtors were also more successful in securing agreements for 
the maintenance of  short-term credit. Seven countries secured such 
agreements in  1985 and  1986: Argentina, Brazil  and the Philippines, 
and four of  eighteen small  debtors,  Cuba,  Ecuador, Morocco,  and 
Panama. 
The Political and Strategic Importance of Debtor Countries 
Size is not the only resource that debtor governments can bring to 
the bargaining table. Small countries can also seek to extract conces- 
sions by exploiting the political concerns of their patrons about national 
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Zaire’s President Mobutu has deftly exploited U.S.  concern with Soviet 
gains in  central and southern Africa  to extract concessional aid. A 
related fear is that the imposition  of austerity associated with stabili- 
zation might create domestic political instability  which in turn would 
have strategic implications. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
staff has written, America “has important security interests in other 
debtor countries. , , . It can hardly afford to stand by and watch the 
economies of these countries collapse, or to have their governments 
undermined politically by financial difficulties”  (cited in Cohen 1986a, 
13  1). A third, somewhat different argument is that stabilization episodes 
tend to be associated with political instability, repression, or the rise 
of authoritarian governments (Skidmore 1977; Frenkel and O’Donnell 
1979; Sheahan 1980; Diaz-Alejandro 1981 ;  Pion-Berlin  1983). New and 
fragile democracies, such as the Philippines, have argued that additional 
support is warranted on these grounds. 
It is clear that policy actions associated with stabilization and struc- 
tural adjustment have lead to political violence and instability in par- 
ticular cases. The policies most likely to generate spontaneous political 
protest are those that result  in  sharp changes in  the prices  of basic 
goods and services: devaluation, increases in oil prices leading to in- 
creased power and urban transportation costs, and the lifting of food 
subsidies. Poorly managed and ill-timed elimination of subsidies have 
been responsible for urban rioting in Egypt, Peru, the Dominican Re- 
public, Morocco, Zambia, and a number of  other countries. Nonethe- 
less, it is  difficult  to establish  any unambiguous  causal  relationship 
between stabilization and political instability, since these programs are 
launched in response to a variety of economic difficulties that may also 
plausibly be linked with political unrest (Side11 1987). As Bienen and 
Gersovitz (1985) point out, food subsidies have been lifted in a number 
of other cases without destabilizing political protest. 
A general relationship between stabilization and the emergence of 
authoritarian or repressive rule  is difficult  to establish as well,  even 
though  they appear to be linked in  several  specific cases, including 
Turkey in  1958-60,  1970-71,  and 1980. A number of  Latin American 
countries have  undergone  dramatic moves toward  democratic rule, 
however, in part because the economic crisis has delegitimated military 
governance. The economic conditions  leading to political  instability 
and change need to be carefully specified. Is it the austerity of  stabi- 
lization programs  that leads to political instability and repressive so- 
lutions or, as Wallerstein (1980) argues convincingly for Brazil prior to 
the 1964 coup, the class conflict and polarization resulting from infla- 
tion? It is important to pose the historical counterfactual: What political 
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Sheahan (1980) argues that those countries in Latin Americafuiling to 
stabilize early in the postwar period were more rather than less likely 
to get authoritarian regimes. 
The precise relationship between economic and political change may 
be difficult to specify, but strategic and political concerns have none- 
theless led creditor governments to use their influence on the boards 
of  the IMF and the World  Bank to press for greater leniency and to 
lobby bank advisory groups for expeditious settlement of rescheduling 
negotiations (Cohen 1986b). Central banks of  the Group of  Five have 
played  an  important  role in  managing  particular  crises through  the 
organization of  rescue packages and the provision of  bridging loans. 
Informal conventions have divided these international lender of  last 
resort responsibilities along lines of regional and political influence and 
interest. Germany has played a leading role in Turkey and Poland, the 
United States in Mexico, France in Francophone Africa (Wellons 1987, 
chap. 7). This decentralized pattern of leadership includes the provision 
and orchestration of concessional assistance, which also follows lines 
of  political interest (OECD 1987). In  1983-84,  27  percent of  all U.S. 
official development assistance (ODA) went to Egypt and Israel. Among 
the other top ten recipients of  American bilateral assistance were El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Turkey, the Philippines, and Sudan. The top ten 
recipients of British and French bilateral assistance are all former col- 
onies. Nine of the top ten recipients of Japanese ODA are in Asia, and 
four of the top five in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with 
which Japan maintains extensive trade and investment relations. 
Turkey provides an example of how geo-strategic concerns influence 
official assistance.  Positioned  on  NATO’s  southern  flank,  Turkey’s 
political significance to the Western alliance grew in the wake of  the 
Iranian  revolution. Domestic political  violence  in  the late  seventies 
enhanced Western concern. Between mid-1977 and 1982, Turkey was 
effectively cut  off  from  international  capital markets.  Celasun  and 
Rodrik  (see the  country  studies for this project) show that  the net 
transfers to Turkey in the period following her debt crisis were much 
more  substantial than were the corresponding transfers to the other 
debtors after  1982, however. Of  $9.8 billion of  debt that Turkey has 
restructured  since  1978, $5.5 billion  has  been  negotiated  through  a 
consortium of OECD governments. Although the OECD did link its 
1979 offer of  concessional finance to acceptance of an IMF program, 
the  amount of  additional  assistance totaled  $3 billion over the next 
three years. The OECD commitments were followed by unusual levels 
of assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. These included five 
consecutive structural adjustment loans totaling $1.6 billion, the largest 
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standby  agreement  in  1980 that, together  with  previous  purchases, 
brought  total  IMF commitments to 870 percent of  quota, the largest 
multiple awarded to any country up until that time. 
In the case of Mexico, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of size 
and political significance. Nonetheless, the U.S. response to Mexico’s 
difficulties was more rapid and comprehensive than its response to the 
problems of  other large  debtors, and was  linked  to concerns about 
security and Mexico’s political  stability (Leeds and Thompson 1987). 
Within a 48-hour period, the United  States pieced  together a rescue 
package that included prepayment of $1 billion  for Mexican oil sales 
to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and a peso-dollar  swap arranged 
through the U.S. Department of  Agriculture.  U.S. Federal Reserve 
officials  persuaded  the central  banks  of  other creditor countries to 
provide a bridge loan under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements and acted as a third party in facilitating the negotiations 
between Mexico and the IMF and its commercial bank creditors (Kraft 
1984). 
Creditor government involvement in rescheduling has been even more 
direct with the low-income countries who rely heavily on concessional 
finance and official  borrowing. While  the debt crisis  is generally  as- 
sociated with  commercial  bank debt, twice as many LDCs classified 
as “official  borrowers” as “market borrowers” have experienced debt 
servicing difficulties (IMF 1987).* Of  185 multilateral debt agreements 
signed between 1980 and 1986, 97 were with commercial banks and 88, 
or 48 percent were with official creditors. In 1985 and 1986, by contrast, 
39 of 68 agreements signed, or 57 percent, were with official creditors 
(World Bank 1987, appendix 2). As a result, Paris Club members are 
under increasing pressure to consider official relief for low-income aid 
recipients, many of which are concentrated in Africa. 
Temptation :  The Availability of Noncondition a1  Resources 
Since the bargaining power of the creditors rests on the debtor’s need 
for continued funding, access to alternative sources of finance will tilt 
the balance of bargaining power toward the debtor. The availability of 
additional resources will  make a country less willing  to accept IMF 
conditionality  and more likely  to experiment  with  heterodox  policy 
alternatives. In general, such windfalls  have proved mixed  blessings 
(Amuzegar 1982; 1983). The reasons are not only economic, but have 
to do with  the political  correlate to the Dutch disease that might  be 
called  the  “Nigerian  disease.”  This phenomenon  helps explain the 
problems of  the capital-importing oil  exporters  Venezuela, Nigeria, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Indonesia prior to the Pertamina crisis. 
The stylized facts are as follows. Commodity booms make govern- 
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relative political ease of taxing commodity exports as opposed to in- 
come, particularly in cases, such as oil, where the commodity is directly 
controlled by the government. In addition, the income from commodity 
exports provides the basis for additional foreign borrowing. This double 
windfall has three political consequences. First, it reduces the political 
incentives to undertake any adjustments that have distributional con- 
sequences; difficult  decisions  are deferred. Second, it  increases the 
range of political claims on state-controlled resources, not only from 
rent- and  revenue-seeking  groups in  society, but  from spending and 
planning constituencies  within the government itself. Finally, the wind- 
falls provide governments with resources that can be used for political 
ends, whether through  corruption and  the “financing”  of elections, 
through pork-barrel projects that cement geographically defined bases 
of support, or through the expansion of subsidies and entitlements. 
It is thus common to see increased government revenues from com- 
modity booms mark the beginning of a cycle of increased borrowing, 
widening fiscal deficits and, ultimately, a return of balance of payments 
crises. Mexico provides an example. In 1978 when the country began 
to experience a boom as the result of increased oil revenues, it repaid 
its obligations to the IMF and abandoned the terms of a standby agree- 
ment reached in  1976. A new cycle of borrowing began, purportedly 
to finance investment in the oil sector itself. Voices within the govern- 
ment and the international financial community were urging caution by 
early 1982, and even before. Yet as Angel Gurria, the Mexican Finance 
Ministry’s director of external borrowing admitted, “there was a po- 
litical decision not to stop the country’s growth in the middle of the 
year” prior to elections (Miami Herald 30 July  1982). Central to the 
fiscal problems the country faced was a rapid expansion of subsidies 
to food and domestic energy consumption designed to increase ruling 
party support among the urban working and middle classes. The Lopez 
Portillo administration also witnessed a dramatic growth of corruption 
at all levels of government. 
5.2.2  Anti-systemic Options: Debtor Cartels and Repudiation 
In addition to the possibility of exploiting available resources within 
the prevailing  case-by-case bargaining  regime,  debtors may conceiv- 
ably seek to alter the rules of the game through cooperative behavior 
or unilateral  attempts to reduce their debt burden. What are the con- 
ditions under which such anti-systemic options might be exercised? 
A number of institutional features make  the barriers to collective 
action among the banks less formidable than those facing debtor coun- 
tries, including the dominance of a relatively small group of money- 
center banks with large exposures and extensive correspondent rela- 
tions with smaller banks (Lipson 1985). These features, as well as the 218  Stephan HaggardiRobert  Kaufman 
bargaining structure outlined above, have made it easier for the banks 
to discourage a debtors’ cartel by isolating and punishing recalcitrant 
debtors (eg., Argentina in 1983-84 or Brazil in 1987), while rewarding 
others, such  as Mexico,  for  “good behavior.”  Given  these circum- 
stances, the debtors with real power-Brazil,  Mexico, Argentina-have 
preferred  the advantages of  striking their own separate deals to the 
risks involved in assuming cartel leadership. 
This behavior reflects a collective action dilemma. The adoption of 
a common front  of  “tough”  bargaining  postures among the debtors 
would bring relief or better terms, but this public good is likely to be 
underprovided because of free riding. Despite the failures of the Car- 
tagena group of  debtors to reach a collective position, the barriers to 
collective action  among debtors should not  be overestimated. First, 
though LDC debt is highly concentrated among a relatively few lenders, 
it is even more concentrated on the borrower side. The defection of 
one large debtor would be enough to change the system substantially, 
even with the assumption of free riding. There can be little doubt that 
the negotiations surrounding Brazil’s February 1987 suspension of in- 
terest payments will have a profound  effect on future reschedulings. 
Second, learning among debtor governments allows the concessions 
granted in one case to become the basis for demands by other countries 
even in the absence of overt collaboration.  When Mexico negotiated 
an innovative  and  relatively  lenient restructuring in the fall of  1986, 
the banks claimed that the deal was sui generis. When similar interest- 
rate terms-l3/16%  over LIBOR-were  extended to Argentina in the 
spring of  1987, the Philippines threatened to reopen negotiations  to 
secure these terms as well. Though the banks insisted that it would 
not reopen talks with  the Philippines, and  the quest was eventually 
dropped, fear of such contagion is one reason why there has been a 
general reluctance on the part of the banks to discuss forgiveness or 
interest-rate capitalization. 
Until recently, the threat of exclusion from access to future financing, 
including not only long-term lending but short-term trade credits, was 
held to be a powerful deterrent against repudiation by individual debtors 
(Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Eaton and Taylor 1986,221-28).  A growing 
number of  countries have  unilaterally  suspended debt payments or 
announced ceilings on repayments, however,  often linked  to overall 
export earnings. 
There are a number of reasons why countries may repudiate. In some 
cases, “repudiation” occurs gradually, growing out of the accumulation 
of arrearages that become so large they are difficult to cover up through 
“new” lending. In some cases, the provision of “new” money through 
concerted lending agreements is foreclosed by banking regulations that 
force banks to write down nonperforming debt; this has been the case 
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Domestic  political pressures can play  a role  in the decision to re- 
pudiate, or can at least help explain the economic conditions making 
such a decision more likely. Alan Garcia’s decision to limit Peru’s debt 
service in 1985 provides the clearest case of a repudiation with domestic 
political roots. Garcia had used economic policy and relations with the 
IMF to mobilize left opposition to the conservative Belaunde regime 
prior  to his  election.  When  announcing  Zaire’s  decision  in  October 
1986 to limit its debt service, Mobutu noted that several other African 
countries had obtained softer terms after outbreaks of domestic unrest, 
while in Zaire, “where the people are disciplined and follow their leader 
in whom they have full confidence, our partners try to tighten the screw 
more and more” (Callaghy 1987, 18). In the case of Brazil, politically 
motivated policy created the conditions leading to suspension of pay- 
ments. Sarney came to office as the head of a new democratic gov- 
ernment with the advantage of large international reserves built up by 
his predecessor. These allowed him to pursue expansionist policies and 
to oversee dramatic increases in consumption and wages. These pol- 
icies ultimately contributed to new payments difficulties. 
Yet  repudiation  still  presents a puzzle. If  a country is  capable of 
repudiating, it should have a threat credible enough to secure its desired 
level of  repayment within the normal restructuring process. Banks should 
be willing to make up the difference between what a country is willing 
to repay and the total debt service with “new”  money that will cover 
interest payments and thus keep the loan on the books  at full  face 
value. This outcome is also superior for the country, even if  politics 
are taken into account, since it would result in a higher level of welfare 
than with repudiation and reduced access to lending. It is possible that 
the threat of repudiation was not held to be credible by the banks and 
that repudiation can thus be seen as the result of failed communication. 
Repudiation might also simply be a move in a more extended bargaining 
game rather than a final outcome. President Sarney, for example, cou- 
pled his announcement of Brazil’s open-ended suspension of interest 
payments with conciliatory signals that the government was not adopt- 
ing “an attitude of confrontation” but rather sought a comprehensive 
solution  (New York  Times,  21  February  1987). President Mobutu of 
Zaire quickly followed  his  announcement with  a trip to Washington 
seeking additional concessional aid. 
A  final  reason for repudiation,  however,  has to do with size, and 
reverses the Keynsian adage that the large debtor holds the bargaining 
advantage, at least  if  exercising the option of repudiation  is seen as 
an advantage. While Brazil’s suspension of interest payments in Feb- 
ruary  1987 provides the most dramatic example of effective repudia- 
tion, the large countries have more typically exercised the tacit threat 
of withdrawal. It has been the smaller and weaker countries that have 
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Dominican Republic, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Zambia. 
Small debtors may be more tempted to “free ride,”  particularly  in  a 
setting  where  increasing  numbers of  other countries are doing  so. 
Reputational reasons on the part of the banks are also a factor, how- 
ever. It is less costly for banks to let  small countries go into default 
than to capitulate to their demands for additional credits if  such de- 
mands establish a precedent. 
5.3  The Domestic Politics of  Stabilization and Adjustment 
In the international bargaining arena, where the balance of power is 
weighted primarily on the creditor side, the central issue has been the 
terms of debt service; it is assumed that repayment hinges on a range 
of domestic macroeconomic and  structural adjustment measures. At 
the domestic level, the emphasis is typically  reversed. External bar- 
gaining positions have been politicized, but this is because stabilization 
and  adjustment have  distributional  consequences for various  social 
groups and thus political consequences for governments in power. In 
this section we seek to explain the conditions under which governments 
will  adopt  orthodox  stabilization  measures-particularly  fiscal  and 
monetary restraint and  devaluation-as  opposed to some heterodox 
alternative, or simply no coherent program at all. This is the problem 
of program  design. Second, we seek to identify the most likely con- 
straints governments face in carrying out their intentions, the question 
of program implementation or “sustainability”  (Nelson 1984a). 
Since these choices have distributional implications, we begin with 
a consideration of the way policy decisions are influenced by the rel- 
ative power of competing social groups. Widely different intellectual 
traditions, including Marxist, pluralist, and neoclassical political econ- 
omy, all converge on the importance of interest conflicts in the for- 
mation of public policy, even if they differ on the types of groups they 
consider politically relevant.  Such “societal” explanations, however, 
often ignore the institutional setting in which policy is formulated and 
implemented.  We  therefore examine three institutional variables: the 
type of regime, political-electoral  cycles, and the strength of  the ad- 
ministrative apparatus. 
5.3.1 
To simplify, interest-based explanations assume that policies are the 
result of exchanges between politicians and their constituents. Politi- 
cians respond  to constituent demands in order to advance their per- 
sonal, electoral, and ideological goals. Interest groups deploy resources 
in  order to gain  particularistic  benefits,  whether through  lobbying, 
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threats, the donation of funds, or the promise of votes (Olson  1982). 
Studies of  economic policies  generally  define  the range  of  relevant 
interests in terms of factor of production (labor vs. capital)  or  by sector 
(urban vs. rural, export-oriented vs. domestic, etc.), and deduce actor 
preferences from the income and distributional consequences of dif- 
ferent policy outcomes (Bhagwati 1982). Policy choice is then explained 
by reference to the balance of power among competing groups or by 
reference to the composition or support base of the ruling coalition or 
party in power. 
There are a number of problems in applying this approach, including 
how to identify the “dominant coalition” in authoritarian settings where 
electoral politics is not central to the design of policy. Additional com- 
plexities are created by the fact that the distributional consequences 
of individual policies are not always clear, can vary between the short 
and long run, and are usually combined in policy packages. The influ- 
ence of particular measures is often difficult  to gauge, even for the 
actors themselves. As a point of  departure, however,  it is useful  to 
examine the political  role  of  business, labor, and  agriculture  in  the 
adjustment process, though as we argue, none of these sectors rep- 
resent undifferentiated sets of interests. 
Business-Government  Relations and the Politics of Adjustment 
The central problem confronting any government in its relation with 
the private sector is establishing a credible and predictable policy en- 
vironment. Confidence in government policy is a major factor in de- 
termining time horizons and willingness to take risk, and thus affects 
levels of investment and capital flight. In turn, the ability of business 
to withhold  investment provides it with a potent lever for bargaining 
with political authorities over economic  policy. The pressure to improve 
the business climate will pose particular problems for leftist govern- 
ments, since business demands for  “reassurance”  place them in  an 
awkward position vis-a-vis their core constituencies. Leftist govern- 
ments, and parties with a history of attacking business and property 
rights, will have difficulty in establishing credibility even if  announced 
intentions are conciliatory. 
Argentina and Korea present a sharp contrast in the ability to inspire 
private-sector confidence. During the 1950s and early 1960s, recurrent 
balance of payments pressures impelled a succession of Argentine gov- 
ernments, including Peron himself in 1951  -52  and the popularly-elected 
Arturo Frondizi in  1959-60,  to adopt exceptionally  severe wage and 
credit restrictions and devaluations. These actions took place in a con- 
text of deep political divisions dating to the period of Peron’s populist 
rule.  Orthodox policy measures could reduce imports, but were un- 
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stagnated over the 1950s and 1960s. The prices of food exports showed 
a rising  secular trend over the period, but the standard deviation of 
annual fluctuation  was over twice as great as the average yearly  rate 
of improvement, reflecting turbulent political cycles (Mallon and Sour- 
rouille 1975). 
Korea’s political  history  is not without  periods of  turbulence and 
political  protest. Nonetheless, during 18 years of uninterrupted rule, 
Park Chung Hee constructed a political system based on close working 
relations  with, and support for, large domestic manufacturers. Labor 
wielded  little  influence.  Even during the period  of  democratic rule 
(1964-72),  opposition  parties were  weak, and overtly leftist groups 
precluded from politics. Investment’s share of GNP  rose steadily during 
Park’s  rule, influenced  by  a coherent indicative  planning framework 
that ensured large firms adequate financing for approved projects (Col- 
lins and Park, see the country studies for this project). Korean eco- 
nomic policy under Park was flexible and responsive to changes in the 
economic environment, but enjoyed a high degree of credibility among 
business,  particularly  when  compared  with  the Rhee regime  of  the 
fifties (Jones and Sakong 1980, 137). 
Though leftist governments will, in general, have more difficulty in 
establishing the credibility of their economic policies than rightist gov- 
ernments, it is not necessarily true that all segments of business will 
favor orthodoxy. Much depends on sectoral position and the nature of 
international trade and financial  links.  Liquid  asset holders, export- 
oriented industries, financial interests, and larger industrial  and com- 
mercial firms with access to external credit markets are more likely to 
benefit  from traditional  stabilization  and  structural adjustment mea- 
sures. Even where they are not politically organized, liquid asset hold- 
ers can exert pressure on decision makers through the threat of capital 
flight. 
Firms with investments in specific assets, import-substituting indus- 
tries, (ISIS), and companies dependent on government contracts and 
credit are more likely to be threatened by  devaluation, budget cuts, 
restrictions on domestic credit, and reforms that reduce protection and 
government support. Where they are weak politically, firms of this sort 
will  adjust economically  or fail.  In countries  where  such firms  are 
prominent and can mobilize  political  resources through peak organi- 
zations, parties, and the media, they will challenge  the imposition  of 
fiscal and monetary austerity. Unable to flee or circumvent the adverse 
consequences of stabilization,  they stay and fight. 
Though it is empirically difficult to disentangle these conflicting sets 
of business  interests, the responses of Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil 
to the stabilization  issues of the  1980s are suggestive of their signifi- 
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military governments of the  1970s, deregulation  of  financial markets 
induced large firms in the industrial sector to invest in financial activ- 
ities.  The legacy  was  highly  volatile  financial and foreign  exchange 
markets that operated as a major constraint on the heterodox leanings 
of the Alfonsin government, encouraging a cautious approach to fiscal 
and monetary policy  after  1985 (Kaufman 1987). In Mexico, larger 
industrial groups in Monterrey, Puebla, and Guadalajara, commercial 
enterprises and new financial institutions played a similar role to the 
liquid asset holders in Argentina (Maxfield 1986). Although during the 
1970s, the government encouraged the growth of industrial groups with 
close links to the state-owned enterprise sector, the stabilization of the 
De la Madrid government after 1982 reflected  strong pressures from 
more economically liberal segments of the business class, whose re- 
sources held abroad have been estimated to equal over 40 percent of 
the country’s total external debt (Garrido and Quintana 1986, 117). 
In Brazil, the Sio Paul0 industrial elite has been  a force pushing 
government policy in a different direction, emphasizing more expan- 
sionary credit and fiscal policies. As early as the 1950s, the S&o  Paulo 
Industrial  Association  played  a role in scuttling a series of orthodox 
stabilization programs. And although they grudgingly accepted the aus- 
terity program under the military government in 1964-67,  they lobbied 
intensively for the more expansionary industrialization programs adopted 
after the late 1960s. In 1981-83,  when balance of payments pressures 
again forced the military to adopt tight money policies, the industrial 
elite stepped up its opposition to the regime itself, helping to tip the 
political  balance  toward  a  transition  to civilian government in  1985 
(Frieden 1987). Since that time, the S&o  Paulo elite generally backed 
the expansionary aspect of the government’s economic policy-espe- 
cially the strong impetus  its Cruzado program  gave to domestic de- 
mand-while  clamoring strongly after 1986 for a relaxation of the anti- 
inflationary  price  freeze and resisting  governmental  efforts to raise 
interest rates and reduce the size of the growing federal deficit (Kauf- 
man 1987). While exchange rate policy is obviously the critical variable, 
it is noteworthy that Brazil’s capital flight between  1976 and 1985 was 
substantially less than that from Argentina,  Mexico, and Venezuela. 
(Watson et. al. 1986, 142) 
Support for structural adjustment measures will also vary by sector. 
The  stance  of  import-substituting  manufacturing  interests  towards 
export-oriented policies, for example, is likely to be ambivalent. On 
the one hand, industries with inherent cost advantages will benefit from 
new incentives. These potential beneficiaries are unlikely to be aware 
of their competitiveness, however, because of long-standing distortions 
in the system of incentives, and are thus unlikely to provide the political 
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regime, information on market conditions and knowledge on the me- 
chanics of production  for export is likely  to be scarce. In Taiwan in 
the late fifties, local firms responded to the slowdown in IS1 by calling 
for the cartelization of the domestic market (Lin 1973). The political 
efforts of organized business in Korea in the early sixties centered on 
securing government support for large import-substituting projects and 
increased access to foreign loans (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 1987). In 
both cases, import-substituting firms demanded and received assistance 
in making the transition to production for international markets. 
The longer an import-substituting policy regime is in place, the more 
politically difficult the transition becomes. Import-substituting  policies 
generally begin by protecting final consumer goods, while allowing the 
relatively  free import of  capital  goods. As IS1  continues, however, 
protection  is extended upstream into intermediate and capital goods 
industries. This broadens the coalition of industries  supporting pro- 
tective policies, not only by creating new protected industries but by 
disadvantaging producers of consumer goods forced to rely on higher- 
cost domestic inputs. The relevant comparison is between the industrial 
policies  of the East Asian  and Latin American newly  industrializing 
countries. Korea and Taiwan experienced relatively short periods of 
import-substitution before emphasizing exports and had not committed 
substantial  investment to intermediate  and  capital  goods industries. 
Brazil and Mexico, by contrast, sought to diversify their exports only 
after decades of IS1 policies. Such a pattern of industrial development 
produces strong protectionist interests, as the heated debate over Mex- 
ico’s entry into the GATT in  1979 showed. The diversification of ex- 
ports is therefore even more likely  to be characterized by  subsidies 
and administrative  measures designed to “push out” exports by off- 
setting previous biases.3 A major point of interest is whether the eco- 
nomic crisis of the early eighties will lead to a rearrangement  of basic 
coalitional patterns in Latin America, as the necessity to export creates 
new trade-related interests. 
The Role of  Labor 
Labor plays a critical role in stabilization and adjustment episodes, 
even in situations where it is the dog that does not bark. As in the case 
of business groups, sectoral distinctions  must be taken  into account 
since they will determine both the ability of labor to organize and its 
likely policy preferences. The urban informal sector has constituted a 
powerful constraint on policy reform in a number of countries because 
of the threat of rioting,  but  in general, those segments of the labor 
force that are presumed to benefit  most from  structural adjustment 
measures,  including  rural  workers  and  smallholders  and  underem- 
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contrast, unionized workers in both the public and private sectors are 
better positioned to oppose devaluation and fiscal restraint, with their 
anticipated consequences for real wages and employment. These work- 
ers are also likely to be concentrated in protected industries, and op- 
pose  import liberalization or an emphasis on exports that demands 
more realistic wage rates. They are also likely to constitute a barrier 
to the privatization or rationalization of state-owned enterprises, 
One might  therefore expect that the level of unionization and the 
likelihood of adopting and sustaining orthodox stabilization and struc- 
tural  adjustment measures will  be inversely  correlated, other things 
being equal. It might also be expected that populist or leftist govern- 
ments that rely  heavily on working class support are more likely to 
tolerate inflation  (Hibbs 1977), experiment with heterodox programs, 
and adopt “tough” bargaining postures, since the costs of stabilization 
and continued repayment are more likely to fall on their core constit- 
uents (Korpi 1983). 
A growing literature on the advanced industrial states has questioned 
the logic underlying these presumptions, particularly the inattention to 
the institutional setting in which labor demands are formulated (Katz- 
enstein 1986; Crouch 1985; Cameron 1984) and the relationship between 
leftist parties and unions (Jackman 1987). Cameron, for example, finds 
that “nations with frequent leftist governments tended to experience 
low unemployment and strike activity and modest increases in earnings 
and prices, relative to the levels and rates found in nations dominated 
by nonleftist governing parties” (1984, 159-60)  Indeed, it has become 
almost a new conventional  wisdom that leftist governments working 
closely through  corporatist structures with encompassing peak labor 
organizations are better positioned to secure wage moderation by ne- 
gotiating compensatory agreements concerning  job security, retraining, 
or unemployment compensation. Nelson (1984a, 1984b, 1985,1987) has 
shown that such compensatory packages are crucial to the success of 
a number of stabilization and adjustment measures in the developing 
world, such as the lifting of food subsidies. 
Holding the economic variables likely to affect labor behavior con- 
stant, particularly  levels  of  unemployment, we hypothesize a  non- 
monotonic  relation between the political  strength of organized labor 
and the challenges they are likely to pose to stabilization and adjustment 
initiatives. Where strategic labor sectors are weak and penetrated, the 
burdens of stabilization policies are easy to impose, although the eco- 
nomic program, and the government itself, may encounter long-term 
costs in terms of losses of legitimacy. Controls on wages and limits on 
the ability of  labor to organize were features of the stabilization pro- 
grams of the “bureaucratic authoritarian” governments of Brazil, Ar- 
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1979) and were components of the Turkish and  Korean programs  of 
the early eighties. 
On the other hand, labor may acquiesce to restraint within the con- 
text of a stabilization program in  situations where it is represented by 
powerful peak associations with  secure positions in the political pro- 
cess. There are few, if  any, developing countries that can match the 
social-corporatist  arrangements of Western  Europe. Nevertheless, in 
Mexico  and  Venezuela  the  integration  of  unions  as components of 
dominant multiclass parties has mitigated labor opposition by offering 
labor  leaders the  opportunity to negotiate  short-term compensation 
and to exercise some influence over longer-run policies. 
The most immediate political challenges to stabilization are likely to 
emerge in  intermediate  situations, where  unions  or informal  sector 
workers possess sufficient resources for defensive mobilization but are 
still vulnerable to periodic repression and lack secure access to decision 
making or clear rights to organize. Many populist movements in Latin 
America fall into this category, including those recently resurfacing in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay after years of military exclusion. Turk- 
ish labor activity during the seventies, Bolivian labor demands in 1984- 
85 and recent strikes in  Korea reveal a  similar pattern. One widely 
suggested strategy for limiting conflict with such groups during periods 
of attempted stabilization has been the negotiation of comprehensive 
social pacts, including understandings concerning wage and price pol- 
icy and other issues of macroeconomic policy. Social pacts, however, 
have  been  and  are likely to be difficult  to conclude or sustain  with 
movements that are decentralized, divided  by  internal  rivalries  and 
concerned with restoring living standards and political rights (Kaufman 
1985; Bianchi  1984). Nor is it clear that relatively weak governments 
can deliver the necessary quid-pro-quos. 
An  alternative means of  containing  conflict,  recently  explored  in 
Argentina, has been to strike agreements with workers in key industrial 
sectors and to live  with  strong criticism and  opposition  from other 
groups within the labor movement. Such opposition, of  course, can be 
considered  a normal part of political life and need not in itself jeop- 
ardize the sustainability of  stabilization and adjustment policies, as- 
suming that a democratic politics has been institutionalized and labor 
is willing to accept the role of a loyal opposition. The still unresolved 
question among the new Latin American democracies is whether the 
military and right-wing groups will tolerate “legitimate”  labor oppo- 
sition, or conversely, whether labor leaders can hold rank-and-file op- 
position within “tolerable”  bounds. 
If  labor organization affects the design and implementation  of  sta- 
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looking policies. In a series of comparative studies, Gary Fields (1984; 
1985; Fields and Wan  1986) has argued that wage-setting institutions 
in the East Asian newly industrializing countries-Korea,  Taiwan, Sin- 
gapore, and Hong Kong-have  favored market determination of wages, 
while those in a number of other small open economies, including Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, and Panama, have been subject to institutionalized wage 
setting. These institutional arrangements limit the downward flexibility 
of wages, with consequences for relative economic performance. The 
advantages of  market-clearing  wage  rates in  the developing country 
context are well known: the avoidance of economic inefficiencies in 
the allocation of labor; fuller labor utilization and lower levels of un- 
employment; greater equity both within the urban working class and 
between the urban and  rural  sectors; and greater ease in  attracting 
foreign investment. 
What has not been adequately underlined is that the labor movements 
in the East Asian success stories have been politically weak, even by 
developing country standards (Deyo 1987; Deyo, Haggard, and Koo 
1986). Labor in Hong Kong has been weakened by waves of migration 
from the mainland, by splits between rival federations-one supporting 
the mainland, one neutral, one supporting  the Kuomintang  on Taiwan- 
and by a liberal policy governing union formation and registration that 
has led to the proliferation of small unions. In Singapore, a powerful 
labor movement and the leftist  party with which it was linked were 
politically outmaneuvered by Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party 
(PAP) in  the early  sixties. PAP-affiliated  unions were brought  under 
quasi-corporatist control. Labor unions in Taiwan developed under the 
auspices of the ruling Kuomintang Party in the early postwar period, 
and are thoroughly penetrated by party cadre. Korea has had the most 
conflictual and openly repressive labor system of the four Asian NICs. 
Labor relations were liberalized following the return to democratic rule 
in 1964, but over the late sixties a number of economically motivated 
restrictions were placed on labor organization, beginning with workers 
in foreign-invested companies. Control of labor became more marked 
after the turn to authoritarian rule in  1973, and has been particularly 
harsh under the government of Chun Doo Hwan when a number of 
labor leaders have been arrested. 
With the exception of Singapore, there is no evidence that controls 
on labor activity were instituted for the purpose of launching export- 
oriented growth. It is plausible, however, that the political weakness 
of  the  labor  movements in  these four countries facilitated  market- 
oriented wage setting systems, managerial flexibility, and the mainte- 
nance of industrial peace which in turn were central to the success of 
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Agriculture and the Rural Sector 
Markos Mamalakis (1969; 1971) and Michael Lipton (1977) have ar- 
gued that the sectoral clashes between agriculture  and  industry  and 
between countryside and city are likely to be of greater political salience 
in the process of economic development than the class conflict between 
labor and capital. This sectoral clash is of importance in the determi- 
nation of trade and exchange rate policies, agricultural pricing policies, 
and subsidies to food consumption. The distributional consequences 
of these various policies are complex, but it is now clear that the policies 
associated with import-substitution-an  overvalued exchange rate, high 
levels of protection to the manufacturing sector, and low or negative 
rates of protection to agriculture-shift  income away from agriculture 
and mining toward services and industry, activities which, in turn, tend 
to be located in  the cities.  This observation has lead to several  hy- 
potheses about why these policies come about and are sustained. The 
most obvious concerns the overall balance between rural  and urban 
interests. First developed by Michael Lipton (19771, this view is stated 
concisely by Sachs (1985) in a recent comparison of Latin American 
and East Asian growth strategies: 
The Latin American governments-whether  civilian or military, right- 
wing or left-wing-find  their most important constituents among ur- 
ban workers and capitalists. For decades, the agricultural sector has 
been relatively weak, though certainly not powerless, almost every- 
where in Latin America, with peasants only loosely organized and, 
with  some exceptions, large-scale agricultural  interests unable  to 
hold decisive sway. Moreover, political unrest is most dangerous in 
the cities, so that urban interests must be bought off first in difficult 
periods. Interestingly, the opposite seems to be true in most of East 
Asia. Governments there, whether Japanese colonial rulers before 
World War I1 or nationalist governments, have felt the pressing need 
to win support of, or at least to appease, the rural sector (p. 550). 
Sachs suggests several proxies for the balance between urban and rural 
interests in East Asia, including the degree of urbanization. He finds 
that levels of urbanization are much higher in Latin America than in 
East Asia, where policies have tended to be more favorable to agriculture. 
A second, related argument has been  developed by  Gustav  Ranis 
(1987) in drawing the same regional contrast. Ranis gives attention to 
the absence of large  rents accruing from agriculture  and natural re- 
source exports in Korea and Taiwan when compared to the Latin Amer- 
ican NICs. Natural resource exports allowed the Latin American NICs 
to maintain import-substitution longer than would otherwise be desir- 
able. Once urban groups gained political control over these rents, they 
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cultural and mining. Abundance of natural resources had the additional 
effect of  making the Latin American countries vulnerable to fluctua- 
tions in their terms of trade. Thus liberalization episodes were subject 
to backsliding in response to changes in export earnings. The result is 
a stop-go pattern of  liberalization in response to external shocks. In 
Taiwan and Korea, by contrast, there were no such rents available to 
finance continued IS1 and thus when U.S. aid began to decline in the 
late fifties and early sixties, it was necessary to shift toward nontra- 
ditional  exports. The absence of surpluses from agricultural exports 
meant  that the rent-seeking aspects of economic policy  that charac- 
terized the Latin American model were partly mitigated, and thus the 
degree of resistance to rnarket-oriented economic policies was less. 
While these arguments are broadly plausible, it is useful to introduce 
some caveats that draw closer attention to how agricultural interests 
are actually represented in the political process. As with business and 
labor, it is first important to draw some rough distinctions within the 
agicultural sector between large landholders on the one hand-whether 
traditional  latifundia,  plantations,  or commercial  farms-and  small- 
holders, tenants, and landless agricultural labor on the other. In general, 
the second group of agricultural interests are difficult to organize, since 
they  are poor,  small, and geographically  dispersed. Where they are 
organized, it is likely to be through the efforts of the government itself, 
which can exercise control through its power over credit, inputs, and 
marketing. Thus the degree of urbanization  is not necessarily a good 
proxy for the power of urban as opposed to rural interests, as table 5.2 
suggests. A relatively large unorganized rural sector can be politically 
offset by a highly organized or volatile urban popular sector, particu- 
larly where governments are weak. Levels of urbanization in African 
countries are quite low, comparable to those in  Indonesia today or in 
Korea at the time of its shift toward manufactured exports, even though 
many of these countries have pursued policies that are strongly biased 
against agriculture (Bates 1981). 
Conversely, it is not accurate to argue that “rural interests” are po- 
litically weak in Latin America simply because the level of urbanization 
is high. While it is true that agricultural producers as a whole have been 
disadvantaged by macroeconomic policies, large landholders have been 
able to use their political influence at both the local and national levels 
to capture particularlistic benefits for themselves, such as credit, access 
to inputs, irrigation, and infrastructure investments (de Janvry  1981 ; 
Grindle 1986). The political conflicts that have wracked Argentina in its 
postwar history have been closely related to a sectoral stalemate, even 
though only a very small share of the country’s population is involved 
in agriculture. During periods of balance of payments difficulties, the 
need to expand exports gives export-oriented agriculture renewed power. 230  Stephan Haggard/Robert Kaufman 
Table 5.2  Indicators of the RuraWrban Balance 
Urban Population  Share of Labor 
as Percentage of  Force in 
Total  Agriculture (%) 





















































Source: World  Bank, World Development Report 1986. tables 30 and 31. 
Despite the rapid growth of nontraditional exports in the Latin Ameri- 
can NICs, in  1983 fuels, minerals and other primary commodities ac- 
counted for 59 percent of total exports in Brazil, 73 percent in Mexico, 
and 84 percent in Argentina. 
One key political variable in determining the orientation of govern- 
ment policy is the extent to which smallholders, tenants, and landless 
labor are available for mobilization by revolutionary or opposition par- 
ties, a point made clearly in the country study on Indonesia. According 
to Woo  and  Nasution  (see the country studies), Soeharto’s attitude 
toward the exchange rate was heavily  influenced  by fears of  the re- 
suscitation  of the Communist  Party of  Indonesia  (Partai Kommunis 
Indonesia, PKI). In 1965, the PKI had more than two million members, 
largely landless peasants in Central and East Java where rice production 
had  virtually  stagnated for over a decade. The conflict between the 
government and the PKI following a failed coup in September 1965 left 
at least  500,000 people  dead. The economic policies  that followed, 
including a sharp devaluation, showed greater attention to the coun- 
tryside than had been the case under Sukarno, even if  they fell short 
of the redistributionist aims of the Communists. The turn to democracy 
in Turkey in 1950 allowed the opposition Democratic Party to mobilize 
support through appeals to rural interests. Democratic Party govern- 
ments over the fifties sought to reverse the bias toward industrialization 
that had characterized economic strategy during the 1930s and  1940s. 
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economic policy pronouncements of the Aquino administration in the 
Philippines. 
Balance of payments constraints rather than concern with the agri- 
cultural sector appear to be the critical variable in explaining the tran- 
sition to export-led growth in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, reducing 
government credit and subsidies to agriculture was a crucial  step in 
the stabilization required to make the transition (Haggard, Kim, and 
Moon 1987). Land reforms in both countries sprang from fears of rural- 
based insurgency, however. The Kuomintang (KMT) lost the Chinese 
civil  war  to a revolutionary communist  party  that  built  its  base  of 
support in the countryside. While no such threat was present in Taiwan, 
KMT leaders were heavily influenced by their experience on the main- 
land in  the design of  their development policies. The South Korean 
government faced rural insurgency up until the eve of the Korean War 
and was powerfully influenced in its land reform efforts by the sweeping 
reforms undertaken in North Korea. 
The absence of a powerful agricultural elite may mitigate the sectoral 
conflict that often surrounds devaluation, but for reasons somewhat 
different  than  those  suggested  by  Ranis.  In  countries  otherwise  as 
diverse as Argentina and Costa Rica, devaluation has been politically 
controversial precisely because it so clearly favors large landholding 
elites. The distributional  conflict is  particularly  acute in  Argentina, 
since the country’s two main agricultural exports, wheat and beef, are 
also wage goods. Hong Kong and Singapore, of course, have no rural 
sectors to speak of. In Korea and Taiwan, land reform eliminated this 
divisive political cleavage and thus changed the politics of devaluation 
and agricultural pricing policies. It should be noted that both  Korea 
and Taiwan have now followed a trajectory that is common to Japan 
and a number of  European countries. As comparative advantage has 
shifted out of agriculture, the continuing political concern with rural 
support has led to highly protective policies. 
Finally, it is not clear that the turn to import-substitution policies in 
Latin America was the result of the rise of urban political forces alone, 
even though the adoption of such policies created its own constituency 
over time (Kaufman 1979). Prior to the Great Depression, white-collar 
urban  workers and industrialists identified their welfare with the ex- 
pansion of the export-economy. With the exception of  Mexico, there 
was never a serious challenge to the property of  traditional elites or 
to their control of  the agrarian and export sectors. A key factor was 
the Depression and World War I1 which resulted in dissatisfaction with 
the prevailing export model. But overtly  “nationalist-populist”  coa- 
litions rose to power relatively infrequently in the thirties and forties. 
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depended to a much greater extent on the mobilization of rural support. 
The post-Depression industrialization process began under the aegis of 
regimes strongly influenced by the agro-export oligarchies in both Ar- 
gentina  and  Chile. And  in  post-Cardenas Mexico  and the Brazilian 
Estado Novo (1937-49,  manufacturing expanded under governments 
that, like the authoritarian regimes of the sixties and seventies, placed 
strict restrictions on the political activities of the urban popular sector. 
This historical digression suggests two further observations. First, 
in the past, external shocks have increased returns to capital and labor 
in the modern manufacturing sector resulting in “natural”  import sub- 
stitution. Latin American  IS1 moved forward by  a series of shocks, 
beginning with World War I and lasting through the supply interruptions 
associated with World War 11. The Depression played a critical role in 
the evolution of  Turkey’s industrial policy  and in  Korea, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines, postwar balance of payments crises set the stage 
for the adoption of import-substituting policies. The current crisis may 
push countries in the opposite direction because of the need to generate 
exports to service their  debt. On the other hand, the rise in  protec- 
tionism and the general slowdown in world economic growth constitute 
less auspicious conditions for the launching of export-oriented policies 
than  those facing Japan and  the East Asian  NICs in  the fifties  and 
sixties. 
Second, caution  has  to be  exercised in  drawing too sharp a  line 
between  “rural”  and “urban,” or “agricultural”  and ‘‘industrial’’ in- 
terests. In the Philippines, landed elites have integrated into financial 
and manufacturing activities, giving them a somewhat ambivalent set 
of interests vis-a-vis trade and exchange rate policy. This might help 
explain why the Philippines, with a relatively low level of urbanization, 
has pursued a development strategy more similar to the Latin American 
pattern. 
5.3.2  The Influence of  Representative Institutions and Regime Type 
Identifying the interests of  major actors is  obviously important in 
understanding  the politics  of stabilization and structural adjustment, 
but as we have argued, the institutional setting can determine which 
interests matter politically.  The major debate in the political  science 
literature on stabilization in the last ten years has centered less on the 
role  of  competing  interest groups than  on the nature of  the  overall 
political regime, and in particular, the question of whether “successful” 
economic stabilization requires authoritarian governments or repres- 
sion  (Skidmore 1977; Diaz-Alejandro  1981,  1983; Pion-Berlin  1983; 
Kaufman 1979, 1985; Haggard 1986; Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Rem- 
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There is no clear evidence that authoritarian regimes in general do 
any better than democracies in imposing conventional fiscal and mon- 
etary restraint. During the 1960s and 197Os, exclusionary military gov- 
ernments in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile did carry out extremely harsh 
shock packages that would not have been sustainable in less repressive 
systems (Kaufman 1979). But during the crisis of the 1980s, Mexico’s 
milder one-party civilian government imposed comparable shocks and 
competitive electoral regimes in Costa Rica and Argentina carried out 
tough, if more moderate, fiscal and monetary restrictions. In addition, 
a number of  “authoritarian”  regimes,  such as Haiti and Zaire, have 
done poorly. The few cross-national political comparisons of IMF pro- 
grams that do exist, such as Remmer’s (1986) study of Latin American 
programs  and  Haggard’s  (1986) analysis  of  Extended Fund Facility 
agre<ements  reveal no systematic association between either democracy 
or dictatorship and the ability to stabilize. Broader studies that have 
attempted to measure the influence of democracy and authoritarianism 
on growth have  yielded  conflicting results  (Marsh 1979; Dick  1974; 
Weede  1983; Kohli 1986). 
Despite the lack of a clear empirical pattern, however, it remains 
plausible that the rules governing public  participation  and represen- 
tation  are important, quite apart from the nature of  the coalition in 
power. The problem lies in the fact that the “democratic”  and  “au- 
thoritarian” categories are too broad to be of analytic use. Finer dis- 
tinctions are required to differentiate between types of democratic and 
authoritarian  rule  and  to link  them more convincingly  to economic 
outcomes. 
Variation in Democratic Institutions: Plebiscitary  vs. 
Consultative Democracy 
A number of variations in democratic institutions can influence the 
making of economic policy, including the strength of political parties 
and the differences between presidential and parliamentary  rule (Ro- 
gowski 1987; Jackman 1987). As noted above in the discussion of labor, 
Katzenstein (1986) and others (e.g., Goldthorpe 1984) argue that ad- 
justment  in  the  advanced  industrial  states is  facilitated  by  social- 
corporatist forms of interest representation in which economic policies 
are framed through  institutionalized  bargaining  among state officials 
and centralized  peak associations of business and labor. Democratic 
governments with more pluralistic and decentralized modes of decision 
making typically had greater problems in this regard. 
A slightly different distinction might be made in the developing coun- 
try context between “plebiscitary” and “consultative”  democracies. 
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primarily on diffuse populist appeals to legitimate their authority. Policy 
is framed through  closed-door deliberations among technocrats  and 
other interests within the “inner circle,” and while individual political 
leaders  may  develop systems  of  consultation  with  affected  interest 
groups, they  are not constrained to do so. Parties tend to be weak, 
vehicles for electoral mobilization rather than for the ongoing repre- 
sentation of  interests. Although economic stabilization initiatives may 
have momentary success in  such a framework, particularly as such a 
system is likely to imply a greater degree of executive discretion, they 
may be more difficult to sustain. On the other hand, we might expect 
better performance in systems that manage to strike a balance between 
coherent  executive  decision-making  authority  and  institutionalized 
channels through which organized groups can articulate their interests. 
An  interesting example is provided by  Argentina’s Austral Plan of 
1985-87,  a relatively  successful  combination  of  orthodox fiscal and 
monetary restraint with more experimental attempts to control prices 
and institute a currency reform (Kaufman 1987). The comparatively 
heterodox aspects of  this package reflected strong political pressures 
for a socially acceptable alternative to the orthodox shocks that had 
been a feature of military rule. At the same time, during 1986 and 1987, 
after several years of  unsuccessful negotiations with the central lead- 
ership of  the Peronist  unions over a  “social  pact,”  the government 
adopted a new bargaining strategy that centered on negotiated  wage 
agreements with individual Peronist unions representing key economic 
sectors. While the heads of the central union confederation continued 
to criticize and demonstrate against government measures,  the  new 
bargaining framework did much to deflect opposition to the more or- 
thodox fiscal and monetary components of government policy. In con- 
trast, in  Brazil-which  corresponds more closely to the plebiscitary 
pattern-a  parallel program, the Plan Cruzado, collapsed in early 1987 
when the government was unable or unwilling to build a broad coalition 
of  party  and  union  interests  behind  necessary  demand  restraint 
measures. 
Although the Argentine story is particularly dramatic because of the 
country’s long history of instability and zero-sum politics, it is not the 
only instance of effective democratic response to stabilization. In Costa 
Rica, a tradition of informal consultation with business and labor unions 
facilitated  acceptance  of  a comparatively  successful  orthodox  IMF 
program in 1982-83 (Nelson 1987). While devaluing and sharply raising 
taxes and public utility and state-owned oil-refinery rates, the govern- 
ment managed and preempted popular discontent with a combination 
of selective wage concessions to low-income workers and a temporary 
food aid program. As a class, these democratic governments may well 
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biscitary democracies.” At the very least, they place some limits on 
the kind of policy adventurism designed for populist appeal; at best, 
consultation provides opportunities for persuasion, obtaining feedback 
and negotiating compensating agreements. 
The Variety of  Authoritarian Institutions: Weak vs. Strong 
Authoritarian States 
As a first cut at classification of single-party and military authoritarian 
governments, it is useful to note some broad characteristics of what 
might  be termed “strong”  and “weak”  authoritarian regimes,  even 
though  these characterizations lump together a number of  different 
variables. The typical “strong”  authoritarian regime would have the 
following features: 
I. Continuity  in  leadership  and/or relatively  clear rules governing 
succession. 
2. A  political  structure  that  insulates  technocrats  and  economic 
decision-makers from societal pressures, as well as from the de- 
mands of  political  elites  themselves. The mechanisms may  be 
through the dominance of a single party, as in Mexico, Taiwan, 
and Singapore, or through  military  rule,  as in Korea, but rests 
ultimately on the decision by political elites to allow technocrats 
the political space to operate. 
3. An economic policy  machinery  with  a minimum  of capture by 
social groups. 
4. “Corporatist”  organization of interests through state-sanctioned 
and-controlled associations. These permit official supervision of 
key social groups and give government officials the capacity to 
control the agenda of demands. 
5. A military,  police, or domestic intelligence  network capable  of 
penetrating  strategic  social  insitutions  and  deploying  violence 
where “necessary.” 
A “weak”  authoritarian state may share many of the formal char- 
acteristics of a strong one, such as prohibitions on independent political 
organization,  and repressive or one-party or military  rule.  But weak 
systems also have these charcteristics: 
1.  Frequent changes in leadership through  “palace coups” or fac- 
tional rivalry within the ruling political elite. 
2. A low degree of insulation for technocrats from the political de- 
mands of powerful social groups and the executive itself. 
3.  A dualistic decision-making structure in which technocrats control 
only a limited range of policy instruments and compete with po- 
litical elites who deploy other public resources for both political 
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4.  Extensive networks of  patron-client, personalistic,  and familial 
relations  within  the formal government structure, sustained  by 
corruption, rent-granting,  nepotism, and  the discretionary  allo- 
cation of governmental resources. 
5. Predatory behavior by military and domestic security forces and 
the  lack of  independent, nonpenetrated organizations  of  social 
control. 
“Strong” authoritarian regimes may differ as much from weak ones 
as from democracies in the way they implement stabilization policy. 
In fact, there is probably greater variation in the performance of de- 
veloping  authoritarian regimes  than  among developing  country  de- 
mocracies,  since  weak  authoritarian  regimes  are  less  capable  or 
interested in  controlling rent-seeking behavior than either strong au- 
thoritarian regimes or democracies. 
Korea is illustrative of how the institutional capabilities of “strong” 
authoritarian regimes help explain the coherence of adjustment policy 
and the speed of its implementation  (Haggard and Moon  1986). The 
need for stabilization and structural adjustment was recognized among 
an alliance of monetarist technocrats prior to Park Chung Hee’s as- 
sassination in October 1979, but reform was delayed by the transition 
to a new government under Chun Doo Hwan. The constitution of the 
new Fifth Republic, designed by the military coup leaders, exhibited 
continuity with its predecessor: a strong executive; a weak legislature 
controlled by the ruling party; forceful executive support for techno- 
cratic initiatives; and various limits on the freedom of  the press, as- 
sembly, and opposition activity. Seeking to distance himself from the 
economic difficulties that had plagued  Park’s  last years, Chun threw 
his support behind the stabilization plans of the monetarists. The ex- 
ecutive’s tight  control of  the budgetary  process allowed  a dramatic 
reversal  in  the rate of  increase of government spending.  While  ex- 
penditure grew 21.9 percent in 1981, it was zero in 1984. The high level 
of the budget devoted to military expenditures makes the Korean fiscal 
structure quite rigid.  Nonetheless, the government acted against the 
interests of groups usually  able to organize against the imposition of 
austerities. Food price supports were cut dramatically, various special 
funds used to target supports to industry were consolidated or elimi- 
nated and even the government administration  itself was streamlined 
through the laying off of over 15,000 employees, an action unthinkable 
in  most  developing  countries. The Korean government never inter- 
vened extensively in wage setting prior to the eighties. After 1981, the 
government relied  on new  and established  institutional  controls, in- 
cluding its informal penetration of the union movement, arrest of labor 
leaders, and restrictive  trade union and new dispute settlement laws 
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A second example of the significance of military-imposed institutions 
is provided by the Turkish case (Pevsner 1984; Okyar 1983). In January 
1980, the civilian government of  Suleyman Demirel moved belatedly 
to develop a stabilization and  structural adjustment plan.  Efforts at 
implementation took place against a backdrop of  parliamentary  stale- 
mate, politically-mobilized labor opposition, and escalating violence. 
In September, the military intervened and enjoyed a high level of public 
confidence because of its ability to control violence and its reputation, 
from previous interventions, of disinterest in long rule. Parliament was 
dissolved and, in general, the military moved to depoliticize society 
through large-scale arrests and limits on the press and the freedom of 
interest-group and political organization. Rather than turning to a new 
economic team, the military retained Turgut Ozal, the principal archi- 
tect of  stabilization under the civilian Demirel government, and gave 
him new freedom to act. The military took major actions in  the area 
of fiscal policy, including a reversal of  politically motivated decisions 
on agricultural price supports, and developed a new set of institutions 
for wage settlement that significantly weakened labor’s power. Strikes 
were banned, the major left-wing labor federation was disbanded and 
collective  bargaining suspended.  Nominal wage increases  that  were 
running  in the 60 to 70 percent  range prior  to military intervention 
dropped to around 25 percent for 1981. As in Korea, the government’s 
actions were not limited to control of labor. Other politically sensitive 
moves included the beginnings of  reform of  the tax  system and the 
state-owned enterprise sector, the liberalization of imports and, in gen- 
eral, the adoption of more liberal and outward-oriented policies that 
had  been  the  subject  of  political  controversey  between  the  parties 
during the 1970s. 
The Philippines in the late Marcos years represents an intermediate, 
or “dualistic,”  type of government that mixed features of  “strong” 
authoritarian rule, such as a powerful executive, weak legislature, and 
the insulation of economic policy making from electoral pressures, with 
extensive corruption and political interference by the president. The 
assassination of Benign0 Aquino in August 1983 triggered a reassess- 
ment of  the Philippines by external creditors. Following a foreign ex- 
change crisis and the declaration of  a moratorium  on debt payments 
in  October, the government came under intense pressures  from the 
private  sector, foreign banks, multilateral  agencies, and  the  United 
States to initiate stabilization and structural adjustment measures. De- 
spite this pressure, the government continued to balk at stabilization 
through  the  first half  of  1984, extending  large credits  to financially 
troubled  “crony”  companies and borrowing heavily to “finance”  the 
parliamentary elections of May 1984. 
As the pressure on Marcos grew from the IMF and external creditors, 
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have a high political cost, particularly  the dramatic stabilization pro- 
gram based on the issue of high-yielding treasury bills. On the other 
hand, a number of structural adjustment measures were actively re- 
sisted. The most important of these was the restoration of market forces 
in  the  sugar,  coconut, and  grains  sectors. Though  the mechanisms 
differed slightly in each case, all three industries had come under state 
or state-sanctioned monopoly control. These monopolies, in turn, were 
in the hands of close political allies of Marcos who provided political 
funds and  organized  regional  and  sectoral  bases of  support (Hawes 
1987). The failure to move forward with reform of this sector was the 
critical factor leading to the suspension of IMF drawings in October 
1985. The study of Indonesia by Woo and Nasution  (see the country 
studies)  suggests a broadly similar political structure, combining islands 
of technocratic rationality and administrative competence with clien- 
telism, executive intervention, and institutionalized corruption. 
For a  number of  small, poor developing countries, the nature of 
“authoritarianism”  is  in  no way  conducive to  implementing  stabili- 
zation and adjustment measures; indeed, the question must be seriously 
entertained whether such countries are capable of formulating, imple- 
menting, and sustaining any coherent economic strategy. In poor, ethn- 
ically  fragmented  societies, such as many  of the small  sub-Saharan 
states, political authority is maintained by patron-client relations. The 
highly personalistic, even familial  autocracies such as those in Zaire 
(Callaghy 1984) or Haiti under the Duvaliers are the clearest examples, 
but the class of such cases is more extensive. While Bolivia saw an 
alternation of constitutional and military rule between 1978 and 1982, 
these formal features of governance were less important than the en- 
demic  instability  of ruling  coalitions  and  the dense networks of  pa- 
tronage that linked political elites, the bureaucracy, and state-owned 
enterprises and client groups. As Malloy  argues, legal  and  political 
institutions were “seen not as ways of doing things but as obstructions 
to any action” (Malloy and Gamarra 1987, 117). Such countries have 
histories of failed IMF programs that founder on the inability of outside 
agencies  to induce a rationalization  of central  government finances, 
even, in the case of Zaire, where recourse was had to the 19th century 
solution of installing expatriate teams in strategic economic policy posts 
(Callaghy 1984). Since the maintenance of political power in such sys- 
tems rests on discretionary access to state funds and instrumental ties 
with key regional, bureaucratic, or ethnic elites, the rationalization of 
public finances is immediately irrational in a political sense. 
The problem  is not  simply one of  “corruption”;  many  countries, 
including Korea, have grown rapidly with some corruption, though the 
levels do not approach the drain on resources visible in Zaire, Haiti, 
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of political institutions capable of channeling and containing demands 
and weak administrative capacity. Under extreme external pressure or 
absolutely  forcing domestic economic developments, such countries 
may institute surprising reforms, such as Zaire’s dramatic devaluation 
of  1982. Nonetheless, in the absence of political  and  administrative 
development, the ability to sustain such reforms or to implement the 
type of structural adjustment required to get on a higher growth path 
is open to serious doubt. 
5.3.3  Political Cycles 
The analysis of the overall balance of interest groups and the nature 
of the political  regime  are useful for underlining  some broad cross- 
national variations in policy patterns. Within nations, however, policies 
are affected by short-term shifts in the political context that condition 
the expectations of key actors and shape opportunities for mobilizing 
support for new policy  initiatives.  A large literature  on the political 
business cycle has argued that regardless of the party in power, eco- 
nomic  policy  will  change over the electoral cycle (Nordhaus  1975; 
Lindbeck 1976; Tufte 1978). While these arguments have been criticized 
on both empirical and theoretical  grounds, they focus attention on a 
critical variable: the time horizons of governments. It seems plausible 
that incumbent governments will grow increasingly reluctant to impose 
unpopular measures as their tenure in office becomes shorter and/or 
less secure. Conversely, they  will  be more prone to take short-term 
political risks if they perceive they will be around to reap the projected 
political gains later on. 
To make such arguments relevant to developing countries, however, 
it is necessary to consider not only changes of  elected governments 
but  noninstitutional  changes of  regime.  Military  intervention or the 
transition  to authoritarian one-party rule has occured in the postwar 
period  in all of the cases included in this project except Mexico (see 
table 5.3). During the 1980s, this trend was reversed: Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia, the Philippines, Turkey, and Korea have made, or are making, 
transitions to democratic rule. We  thus explore the political cycle hy- 
pothesis  in  two developing country contexts: in those where consti- 
tutional changes of government have been comparatively  routine and 
stable, and  those where the security of  incumbents is  less  securely 
institutionalized. 
Electoral Cycles in Constitutional Systems 
There are several variants of the political business cycle model, but 
all rest on several basic assumptions: that governments seek to max- 
imize their electoral chances; that voting behavior is driven by short- 
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Table 5.3  Changes in Government,  1970 to Present, Select Countries 
CountrylDate  Head of  Government  Form of  Government 
Argentina 
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Table 5.3  (continued) 
CountrylDate  Head of Government  Form of Government 
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“Sarney was chosen vice-president, and assumed the presidency on  the death of the 
presidential candidate, Tancredo Neves. 
governments can manipulate the economy to enhance their electoral 
chances. According to the model developed by Nordhaus (1975), for 
example, governments will choose combinations of inflation  and un- 
employment on the short-run Phillips curve that are optimal with ref- 
erence to the popular vote function, even if they involve a heavy discount 
for future inflation.  In the context of stabilization episodes, govern- 
ments facing electoral contests would therefore be more likely to resist 
orthodox measures and to seek heterodox alternatives. 
The empirical evidence for a political  business cycle is  extremely 
weak for the advanced industrial states (Alt and Chrystal 1983, chap. 5). 
Brian Barry has also forcefully challenged the analytic underpinnings 
of the model, arguing it assumes “a collection of rogues competing for 
the favors of  a larger collection of dupes” (Barry 1985, 300). Many of 
the political and institutional characteristics of the advanced industrial 
states that mitigate the political business cycle are absent in the de- 
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more informed publics, more independent media coverage of economic 
policy, more institutionalized forms of consultation which lengthen the 
time horizons of affected social groups, and extensive welfare systems 
that cushion the costs of unemployment. Given generally lower levels 
of income and extensive poverty, electoral support in the developing 
world might plausibly be linked to the government’s ability to deliver 
short-term material benefits. 
These hypotheses can be explored in  two ways. One  is  to focus 
directly  on the politics  of  stabilization.  The political  business cycle 
hypothesis would lead one to expect strong pressures on decision mak- 
ers from  members of  the party  in  power  facing electoral  contests. 
Regardless  of  initial  ideological  predilections,  this  has  the  effect  of 
splitting  governments into pro- and  antistabilization factions. In Ja- 
maica  under the leftist  Manley, where there was  little faith in  IMF 
programs  in  the first place, there is  evidence that populist  factions 
within  the government party  sought to advance their agenda by  ag- 
gressively politicizing the IMF issue (Stephens and Stephens 1986). In 
Sri Lanka, by contrast, where a conservative government under J. R. 
Jayardene launched wide-ranging reforms after 1977, battles between 
the party in parliament  and the more conservative Finance  Ministry 
are also visible (Haggard 1986). Similarly, as Korea has moved toward 
electoral politics,  government party legislators  have been  forced  to 
respond to the opposition  by  taking  positions  critical  of  unpopular 
government initiatives, such as import-liberalization (Haggard and Moon 
1986). 
The electoral  cycle hypothesis  can also be analyzed  by observing 
the government’s macroeconomic policy behavior. Barry Ames’s (1987) 
research on Latin American fiscal policy from 1945 to 1980 finds strong 
evidence of electoral cycles. When an election approached, expendi- 
tures rose as a way of reassuring followers and attracting new ones. 
When the election passed, expenditures continued to rise if a new leader 
or party was elected. 
The Mexican  experience over the  last twenty  years provides  the 
clearest example of a political business cycle. Despite the continuity 
of one-party rule, elections are seen by Mexican  political officials as 
playing an important function in legitimating the political system. In 
each of the last three changes of administration (1970, 1976, and 1982), 
expansionary fiscal  and  monetary policies  coinciding with  elections 
generated subsequent inflationary and balance of payments pressures. 
Stabilization initiatives followed during the initial  years of  each new 
administrative term, generally leading to reductions  in  inflation rates 
and current account deficits, that were then followed in  1975-76  and 
1981  -83  by a new round of inflationary and balance of  payments pres- 
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also been attributed to election year spending (Dohner and Intal, see 
the country studies). 
If  the period prior to elections is likely to be characterized by ex- 
pansionary policies and resistance to stabilization, the periods follow- 
ing elections  will allow governments more leeway to introduce reforms. 
Certain factors are likely to expand the room for maneuver of newly 
elected governments beyond the temporary deliverance from the pres- 
sure of electoral contest. First, is the nature of the previous govern- 
ment’s policies. The greater the perception and reality of failure, the 
greater the space for innovation  and reform.  This helps explain the 
dramatic initiatives undertaken in  Bolivia under the Paz Estenssoro 
government in September 1985. Second, the government gains where 
electoral opposition is weak and divided. This is not only true because 
it provides the legislative space to launch initiatives, but because it is 
likely to be correlated with a weak ability of the opposition to galvanize 
action outside of the legislature, such as through  strikes, that would 
undermine stabilization and adjustment efforts. 
Unstable  Democracies and Transitions to and from  Authoritarian Rule 
As table 5.3 suggests, the majority of stabilization efforts have come 
in  situations where the tenure of  incumbent governments, whether 
authoritarian or democratic, is highly uncertain. This uncertainty sur- 
rounding the fundamental rules of the political game affects politicians’ 
time horizons and policy choices. 
The principal  challenge facing the leaders of new  governments in 
unconsolidated  democracies is typically  to sustain the mass support 
that had previously been built up during the challenge to the outgoing 
dictatorships. Since the shift from authoritarianism to democracy raises 
hopes for an improvement in welfare as  well as political freedom, newly 
elected leaders face expectations that are not conducive to the impo- 
sition of austerity.  On the contrary, whereas new  administrations in 
stable electoral  systems may  choose to pay  the short-term costs of 
stabilization  early  in  their  terms, the leaders of  unconsolidated  de- 
mocracies  may turn to economic populism as a means of cementing 
both electoral support and, where there is a lingering threat from an- 
tidemocratic  forces, broader societal support for the democratic project 
itself.  The new  administrations  of  Alfonsin  in  Argentina,  Sarney in 
Brazil, and the succession of civilian governments in Turkey after the 
return to democracy in 1973, and again after 1983, behaved in precisely 
this way. The return to democracy in Bolivia under the Siles govern- 
ment in  1982 was not followed by large increases in public spending, 
but as Morales and Sachs (see the country studies) point out, the new- 
left coalition government was unable to reduce the deficits it inherited 
from earlier governments. This pattern holds for earlier periods as well. 244  Stephan HaggardiRobert Kaufman 
In Argentina, for example, Frondizi (in  1958), Illia (in  1964),  and the 
Peronists themselves (in  1973),  all entered office after periods of  mil- 
itary dictatorship with wage increases and expansionist economic pro- 
grams aimed at accelerating growth. 
A  new  phase in  the cycle is  reached as such  projects  encounter 
constraints and governments are forced to turn toward orthodoxy. Dur- 
ing the 1950s Per6n and Frondizi imposed two of the harshest and most 
orthodox stabilization programs  in  Argentine  history.  Menderes for- 
mulated a wide-ranging stabilization program in Turkey in  1958 after 
years of expansionist policies. Alfonsin began to change policy course 
late in  1984,  while the populist  Bernard0 Grinspun was still  finance 
minister. The Austral package of 1985,  despite its heterodox price con- 
trol features, continued  in quite conservative fiscal and monetary di- 
rections throughout most of 1986-87.  In early 1987,  after several years 
of  rapid  economic expansion, the Sarney government faced  similar 
external accounts pressures, and although one component of the re- 
sponse was a moratorium on external debt payments, the government 
also appeared to be preparing to adopt a tougher stabilization package 
at home under the leadership of a new finance minister, Bresser Pereira. 
These episodes suggest the following stylized cyclical pattern for new 
democracies: expansion, followed by balance of payments problems, 
followed  by  attempts  to  impose  relatively  orthodox  stabilization 
packages. 
New authoritarian regimes appear to follow the opposite path. There 
are examples of populist military governments: Bolivia in 1970-71,  the 
Peruvian experiment of the early seventies, and the first year of Korea’s 
military rule in 1961-62,  Typically, however, the military seizes power 
in the midst of political crises that have economic correlates, and the 
policies  pursued  in the initial  years in  office reflect commitments to 
impose “discipline”  and “rationalize” the economic system, in part 
by politically limiting the demands of leftist and labor groups. This was 
the general pattern, through under different constraints, in Brazil (1964), 
Argentina (1966  and 1976),  Turkey (1971  and  1980),  Indonesia (1966), 
Bolivia (1971),  and Korea (1980-81),  as well as in  Chile and Uruguay 
in the mid-1970s. As the initial crisis is brought under control, however, 
authoritarian regimes begin to face new problems of political consoli- 
dation  or transition  (Ames 1987,  chap. 5).  At  this point,  they  come 
under strong pressure to pursue more growth-oriented policies, if  not 
to build support, then at least to fend off or moderate the militancy of 
the opposition. Brazil’s externally financed industrial expansion of the 
1970s provides  one striking example. The decisions  to pursue high- 
growth policies through the oil shocks coincided almost exactly with 
decisions  taken by  the military  regime  concerning the  “decompres- 
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electoral competition and pluralistic politics. The transition from mar- 
tial law in the Philippines (announced in December 1981) was followed 
by  local and parliamentary  elections in  1982 and  1984 that were ac- 
companied  by  sharp expansions in  the  money  supply. The military 
regimes exiting from Argentina in  1970-73  and 1980-83  did so under 
much more chaotic and unplanned circumstances. Yet both felt it im- 
perative to step away from the economic orthodoxy of the early years 
of the regime and to adopt policies considered more favorable to the 
Peronist unions and local manufacturing groups. Thus, while govern- 
ments in unconsolidated  democracies expand then stabilize, their au- 
thoritarian  counterparts  stabilize  then  expand.  In  the  aggregate, 
economic performance may look  similar for democratic and authori- 
tarian regimes, as Remmer (1986) argues, but these averages conceal 
differences in the underlying dynamics and timing of policy choices. 
5.3.4  The Bureaucracy: Adminstrative  Capacity and the State as 
Interest Group 
The foregoing discussion has focused on political competition among 
interest groups, politicians, and parties. It is clear, however, that char- 
acteristics of  the bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics  are also im- 
portant  for  understanding  the  ability  of  governments  to  manage 
stabilization crises. This is true for two reasons. First, the administra- 
tive capacity of the government affects its ability to carry out coherent 
economic policy. This is particularly true of those structural adjustment 
measures which demand complex organizational support to be effec- 
tive. The attention given to “policy reform” among economists is rarely 
matched  by adequate attention to the administrative  requirements of 
successful  policy  implementation. But the bureaucracy is  important 
for a second reason. In many developing countries, whether democratic 
or authoritarian, public  employees constitute an extremely powerful 
political force. In a number of low-income developing countries, they 
are the “urban interest.”  A number of policies associated with  stabi- 
lization and structural adjustment, including fiscal and wage restraint 
and the privatization of state-owned enterprises, pose direct challenges 
to the interests of public employees. 
Administrative capacity is affected by several interrelated aspects of 
staffing  and organization.  The most basic  factor is  the existence of 
institutional  mechanisms  for training  technocratic personnel  and  re- 
cruiting them into pivotal decision-making positions. Such mechanisms 
are well  developed in  Korea, where technocratic teams with  fairly 
unified economic ideologies have controlled a highly centralized eco- 
nomic decision-making apparatus over a long period of time. They are 
less developed in countries like Bolivia, Haiti, and a number of low- 
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pertise is generally low or where trained technicians face overwhelming 
political constraints in  their efforts to influence the policy agenda. In 
between lie  a number of  cases where the overall  level  of  technical 
expertise is  high,  but  where economic decision-making authority is 
fragmented  among ministries  representing  competing  ideological  vi- 
sions or political  constituents. This was true for the Lopez Portillo 
administration in Mexico, under Soeharto in Indonesia, and in Turkey 
over the late 1970s. Elsewhere, technocrats have been circumvented 
by interventionist executives, as was true in the late Marcos years in 
the Philippines. While it is very difficult to generalize about these in- 
trabureaucratic conflicts, it is a truism to say that they have a powerful 
influence on the design and implementation of economic programs. The 
politics  of  stabilization  and  structural adjustment is  also a form  of 
bureaucratic politics. 
Procedures for monitoring economic variables,  including the accu- 
mulation of debt itself, are one revealing indicator of the administrative 
capacity of developing country bureaucracies. The studies for the proj- 
ect suggest repeatedly that even in relatively developed countries, ma- 
jor gaps existed prior to the debt crisis in governments’ knowledge of 
the extent of debt accumulation. In Mexico, there was a sophisticated 
system for monitoring public, but not private, debt and in Argentina 
the crisis was clearly exacerbated by lack of clear information. 
States also vary in the organizational resources and range of policy 
instruments available to implement the more selective forms of eco- 
nomic intervention  associated with  some structural adjustment mea- 
sures.  These  include  promoting  technological  research,  facilitating 
adjustments in labor supply or shifting resources expeditiously into the 
export  sector. Korea’s transition  to export-led growth  provides  an 
important, and often misunderstood, example (Haggard, Kim, and Moon 
1987). The dominant neoclassical explanation of this transition holds 
that it was the result of reforms in the structure of incentives, including 
primarily a liberalization of imports and a devaluation of the exchange 
rate. While these reforms were no doubt important, they were accom- 
panied by a range of  supportive interventions, including  highly  sub- 
sidized credit from the state-owned banking sector. But the government 
also developed a sophisticated  organization for providing  market in- 
formation, assisting firms in  developing  new  products, forging  links 
with foreign buyers, and monitoring export behavior, in  some cases 
down to the level of the individual firm. In addition, the transition to 
export-led growth was preceded by fundamental institutional changes 
in the structure of economic decision making. Under President Syng- 
man Rhee (1948-61),  business-government  relations  were character- 
ized  by  pervasive  rent  seeking and  corruption, with  the result  that 
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alized. Under military rule (1961-63),  old networks of political influ- 
ence were broken and new power invested in a highly centralized and 
autonomous Economic Planning Board. Technocrats  gained new access 
to political  elites.  New organizations  were also developed to allow 
business  to communicate  with government over their policy  needs, 
such as monthly export meetings attended by the president himself. In 
sum, the transition entailed not  only policy reforms  but institutional 
innovation as well. 
The issue is not simply whether the state has appropriate information 
and policy instruments at its disposal. The bureaucracy must also be 
seen as a political actor. The case studies show repeatedly that indi- 
vidual government units and corporations made foreign exchange com- 
mitments without the approval of ministers of finance or central banks, 
even though such commitments became central government liabilities. 
The behavior of the state-owned enterprise sector was crucial to un- 
derstanding the debt crises in all the countries included in this project. 
Some of these enterprises, such as Mexico’s PEMEX or Indonesia’s 
Pertamina, represent p,olitical constituents in their own right; the man- 
agers who head them are more powerful  than the ministers who are 
nominally  responsible  for overseeing  their behavior.  As is now well 
known, state-owned enterprises have assumed a host of political func- 
tions, including the transfer of subsidies to consumers, the provision 
of employment, and in Indonesia, the generation of revenue to finance 
the military. Over time, domestic suppliers and purchasers of the out- 
puts of  state-owned enterprises also develop strong interests in their 
procurement, and pricing policies can be used to favor selected client 
groups. Where public sector workers are unionized,  they place addi- 
tional  constraints on  the government’s freedom of  maneuver.  New 
studies suggest that the main political barriers to privatization are likely 
to reside within the state apparatus itself (Vernon, forthcoming). 
While it should be clear that bureaucratic capabilities matter,  two 
somewhat contradictory caveats are required. First, the ability of bu- 
reaucracies to act, even highly competent ones, is dependent on the 
larger balance  of  forces within  the political  system as a whole.  In 
Mexico during recent decades the technocratic influence of the treasury 
and central bank has changed directly with the broader political strategy 
of successive presidential terms. The treasury and central bank dom- 
inated economic policy making in the 1950s and 1960s, but their power 
declined dramatically under Luis Echeverria (1970-76),  and to some 
extent, under Lopez Portillo (1976-82)  before being restored to a piv- 
otal decision-making role under De la Madrid (1982-88).  Similar stories 
could be told about Indonesia and the Philippines, where the freedom 
of the technocrats to act independently was ultimately determined by 
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The second, partially contradictory caveat concerns the possibility 
of  ‘‘overcapacity”-rigidities  that result  from the persistence of  or- 
ganizational routines that impede, rather than facilitate adjustment. The 
dogmatic  course pursued by  entrenched laisser-faire technocrats in 
Argentina and Chile provides one possible example of  this in the late 
1970s. The central policy debate in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in 
the early eighties has been over the degree to which government should 
continue to guide the process of industrial innovation (Cheng and Hag- 
gard 1987). All three possess strong dirigiste traditions, some elements 
of  which may now present barriers to more rapid growth. 
5.4  Conclusion: Politics and Policy 
Before suggesting some conclusions, it is important to underline an 
important limitation on political analysis.  Prescriptive policy analysis 
has as its purpose the identification of policies that are optimal given 
some criteria such as efficiency or growth. Positive political analysis, 
by contrast, often takes the form of suggesting why certain economi- 
cally optimal  policies  are unlikely to be adopted, or are likely to be 
distorted in implementation.  If  economists often tend toward volun- 
tarism, in  which political contraints are explained by  lack of  ‘‘will,” 
political  scientists  can be  overly  deterministic.  The challenge for a 
prescriptive  policy  analysis that incorporates political  variables is to 
identify  those variables  which  are manipulable and those which  are 
not. This task is by no means easy; what constitutes a constraint in 
one political  system may be overcome through  astute political  lead- 
ership and persuasion in another. 
It  may  appear that the most unmanipulable  variable in  the policy 
equation is the overall balance of  interest groups. We  suggested some 
conditions  under which  the  interests of  business, labor,  and urban 
groups were likely to cut against orthodox stabilization measures, or 
even to undermine the integrity of more heterodox ones. But interests 
are not, in fact, fixed. Actors are not necessarily aware of their interests 
in a particular policy issue, and may be myopic with reference to the 
longer-term  consequences of  their own preferences. Some policies, 
such as taxation, are immediately visible in their effects. The distri- 
butional consequences of  others, such as exchange rate management 
or trade policy, are less visible. If we begin with the critical assumption 
that stabilization and adjustment are not just technical exercises, but 
demand the building of coalitions of support, it is crucial that potential 
beneficiaries be identified and persuaded of their interest in the success 
of the programs. This is true regardless of the substantive design of 
the program. Research on the distributional consequences of  stabili- 
zation programs is not only important to identify who gains and loses 
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Regime type also seems a variable that is not manipulable. Within 
the broad categories of “democratic” and “authoritarian” regimes, we 
have  suggested that consultative mechanisms may assist  in reaching 
consensus on program goals, but  studies by political  scientists  have 
shown that the nature of  these mechanisms-who  is included and ex- 
cluded and on what terms-can  themselves be the source of intense 
political fights (Bianchi 1984). Administrative development is, at least 
over the longer run, a variable which is subject to manipulation,  in- 
cluding  by  outside actors. In general, it  seems that the multilateral 
institutions have focused too much attention on discrete policy reforms, 
and not enough on designing the institutions and training the personnel 
that will  be able to implement them over the longer run. Exercising 
outside influence demands strengthening the hands of reformers within 
the government. 
It is not clear, however, how far outside agents can, or should go in 
urging changes in the political and administrative  structures of target 
countries. If the charge of interference in economic policy is a common 
stumbling block  to effective programs, the charge of interference in 
domestic politics is likely to be even more damning. A second reser- 
vation is that dissimilar political systems will require different types of 
policy advice; this necessarily complicates program design. In systems 
with  a  “critical  mass”  of  technocratic expertise and with  relatively 
well-developed  administrative  routines  and  capacities, consultative 
mechanisms that enhance the capability of the administration are likely 
to be a good. In countries where the bureaucracy is penetrated by 
outside political forces and the level of technical expertise is low, it 
may be better to advise market-oriented policies and a reduction of the 
state’s role, not only on the grounds of economic efficiency, but on the 
grounds that such policies  reduce opportunities for rent-seeking  be- 
havior. It is not enough, however, simply to assume that all developing 
countries fall in the latter category. 
The greatest degree of planning freedom appears to come with ref- 
erence to the timing of outside advice. We  have suggested some fairly 
obvious generalizations about when programs are likely to succeed and 
fail as a result of political cycles. This suggests that in some circum- 
stances, no  program  may  be  superior to one that is  likely  to raise 
expectations and fail. In the end, however, there is no substitute for a 
nuanced understanding  of  the particular political  setting into which 
economic programs are introduced. 
Notes 
I. This was the result of  two agreements, one with Mexico, one with Ven- 
ezuela, which provided long maturities but no grace periods. 250  Stephan HaggadRobert Kaufman 
2. “Market borrowers” are those obtaining at least two-thirds of their ex- 
ternal financing from commercial sources from 1978 to 1982; “official  borrow- 
ers” are those obtaining less than two-thirds of their external financing from 
commercial sources (Watson et al. 1986). 
3. An alternative solution is the creation of an export enclave, such as that 
along Mexico’s border with the United States, which is only weakly integrated 
with the rest of the economy. 
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